

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT AT JUNEAU

RESURRECTION LUTHERAN
CHURCH,

Plaintiff,

v.

KAREN LAWFER, KAREN PERKINS
and BRAD PERKINS, in his individual
capacity and d/b/a JuneauLive.org and
RLClive.org,

Defendants.

RESURRECTION LUTHERAN
CHURCH,

Counter-Complainant,

v.

LISA BRENDLE,

Counter-Defendant.

KAREN PERKINS and RESURRECTION
LUTHERAN CHURCH,

Third-Party Complainants,

v.

LISA BRENDLE and KRISTIN CA-
DIGAN-MCADOO and UNKNOWN
PARTIES,

Third-Party Defendants.

Case No. 1JU-24-00681 CI

**ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS, DENYING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, GRANTING
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, AND DENYING
MOTION TO COMPEL**

Plaintiff Resurrection Lutheran Church (“RLC”), Counter-Defendant/Third-Party Defendant Lisa Brendle, and Third-Party Defendant Kristin Cadigan-McAdoo (collectively, the plaintiffs or RLC), seek dismissal of any claims arising from Defendant Karen Perkins’ employment by RLC.¹

¹ Case motion 10.

Perkins opposes the motion to dismiss, and she, Karen Lawfer, and Brad Perkins (collectively, the defendants) move for summary judgment.²

The defendants have also filed a motion to compel discovery.³

The plaintiffs oppose summary judgment and cross-move for summary judgment.⁴

1. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After the initiation of this litigation between church factions, the court, *sua sponte*, raised the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and directed the parties to brief which claims and counterclaims are subject to the court's civil jurisdiction.

RLC identifies three broad categories of claims. First, there are claims by RLC seeking validation of the election of its officials necessary to conduct the organizational needs and financial affairs of the church.⁵ RLC argued that the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate these issues, *but may need to defer to church authority with respect to the proper election of church officials and practical issues related to the use of church facilities and assets*.⁶ Second, there are doctrinal matters over which the court plainly lacks jurisdiction.⁷ Finally, there are employment claims over which, RLC argues, the court lacks jurisdiction.

Defendants also break down the claims into three categories. First, matters related to the election of officers to the church council, including claims of illegal notice and of bullying that affected the outcome.⁸ Second, the ending of Pastor Karen Perkins' call.⁹ Finally, missing funds from a church bank account.¹⁰ Defendants argue that the court has jurisdiction over all these claims.

² Case motion 17.

³ Case motion 14.

⁴ Case motion 19.

⁵ RLC's *Brief on Jurisdiction (RLC Brief)*, pp. 2-3. *See also Verified Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Potential Equitable Relief ("Complaint")*, ¶¶ 1, 2, 13-15, 20-24.

⁶ *RLC Brief*, p. 3 (emphasis added). RLC's concession of jurisdiction was half-hearted, at best, and is at least somewhat at odds with the position it now takes.

⁷ *Id.* *See also Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint ("Answer")*, 1 ("This dispute is fundamentally about disagreements in doctrine and the application of the applicability [sic] of Christian ethics and codes of behavior to intra-church relationships, elections, and the broader mission of the Church in the World.").

⁸ Defendants' *Brief on Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine ("Defendants' Brief")*, 7-10.

⁹ *Id.* at 10-12.

¹⁰ *Id.* at 12.

2. FACTS

Resurrection Lutheran Church of Juneau, Alaska (“the church”) has been a worshipping congregation since 1926.¹¹

The church is incorporated under the laws of Alaska.¹² It is governed by its Constitution and Bylaws (“Constitution”), which were last amended on February 25, 2024.¹³ It is an “interdependent part of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (“ELCA”), and of the Alaska Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (“Alaska Synod”).”¹⁴

The church constitution specifically addresses disagreements within the congregation:

When there is a disagreement between or among factions within this congregation on a substantive issue which cannot be resolved the parties, members of this congregation may petition the synod bishop for consultation after information the president of this congregation of their intent to do so. The synod bishop shall seek a timely resolution of the dispute. If the issue relates directly to the pastor, the bishop may begin the process in †S14.18.d. In all other matters, the bishop shall refer the matter to the Consultation Committee of the Synod, which shall undertake efforts to find an appropriate solution. If the Consultation Committee’s efforts fail to resolve the dispute, the entire matter shall be referred to the Synod Council for adjudication by whatever process the Council deems necessary. The Synod Council’s decisions shall be final.¹⁵

The congregation is presently riven by substantive disagreements that led to this litigation and which underlie the factions’ competing motion practice: who controls the operations of the church, including its religious and ministerial practices, and who controls the church facilities and finances?

¹¹ Declaration of Kendall D. Koelsch (“Koelsch”), ¶ 4; Declaration of Timothy Oslovich (“Oslovich”), ¶ 3.

¹² Exhibit 1, C1.03. Neither the Constitution nor the parties specify the church’s status. While counsel referred to it as a “creature of the state” during oral argument, it is unclear if the church is a religious corporation under AS 10.40 or a different entity type. While this distinction does not matter for purposes of this order, certain important consequences follow entity choice. For instance, AS 10.40 does not authorize proxy voting, the issue addressed in *Herning v. Eason*, 739 P.2d 167 (Alaska 1987).

¹³ *Motion for Summary Judgment*, Exhibit 1.

¹⁴ Exhibit 1, *C6.01.

¹⁵ Exhibit 1, *C15.11.

On February 4, 2024, the church elected 10 church members to 3-year terms on the Congregation Council.¹⁶ On March 7, 2024, that new Council met and elected new officers.¹⁷ Lawfer describes the election of these “minority-side” members as a “surprising turn of events” and alleges that the election was tainted by “bullying, harassment and swarming” of a council member.¹⁸

On May 3, 2024, Alaska Synod Bishop Shelly Wickstrom, concerned about the church’s ability to financially support a full-time pastoral ministry, requested a congregational meeting for June 9, 2024.¹⁹ The issues to be addressed in this meeting came in large part from a March 21, 2023 Assessment and Recommendations document from Bishop Wickstrom, including a decline in active membership, financial challenges, struggles to make decisions about “their congregational life,” and the need for “clarity of vision and purpose.”²⁰ The assessment characterized the growing disagreement in the congregation: “There is a false dichotomy festering between those who are energized by social ministry and those who hunger for more reverent worship who are assumed to be the bigger financial donors. This is unhealthy for the congregation and reveals a lack of spiritual grounding.”²¹

On May 16, 2024, eleven Council members attended a meeting regarding conflict resolution and bullying with Rev. Laurin Vance, a Lutheran Conflict Mediation Facilitator.²² As Brendle called the meeting to order, Lawfer interrupted, declared the current Council illegitimate, reclaimed the presidency and identified new officers.²³

Lawfer presented corrected minutes of the March 7, 2024 meeting, which declared that “Due to election violations of Resurrection Lutheran Church’s (RLC) Meeting Code of Conduct) that changed the outcome of the election, all acts of the illegitimately elected officers and, therefore, the council, are null and void as being tainted from the date of this meeting to May 16, 2024.”²⁴ Lawfer alleges that Brendle was ineligible to serve because, based on Lawfer’s review of prior council minutes, she had already served for six

¹⁶ Koelsch at ¶ 12.

¹⁷ *Id.* at ¶ 14.

¹⁸ Affidavit of Karen Lawfer (“Lawfer”) ¶ 2.c. *See also* Exhibit 4.

¹⁹ Koelsch at ¶ 19.

²⁰ *Id.* at ¶ 20. *See also* Attachment 3.

²¹ *Id.*

²² *Id.* at ¶ 21.

²³ *Id.* at ¶ 25. *See also* Lawfer at ¶ 2.c.

²⁴ Lawfer, Exhibit 4.

consecutive years.²⁵ Seven of the voting council members, including Perkins and Lawfer, subsequently claimed that they would have voted differently had they “not been unduly influenced in violation of the Basic Rules of the RLC Meeting Code of Conduct.”²⁶

The following day, Lawfer notified the congregation by email that she was now the Council president. In the interim, the ostensibly ousted members sought the assistance of the Alaska Synod.²⁷

Lawfer attempted to cancel Bishop Wickstrom’s June 9, 2024 congregational meeting, denying access to the church sanctuary. The meeting was held in the library.²⁸

Thirty members, a quorum, attended physically or by Zoom.²⁹ They voted to reduce the full-time pastoral ministry to half-time and voted against continuing the call of Perkins.³⁰

On September 10, 2024, the Synod Council met to adjudicate disagreements among members of the church.³¹ The adjudication followed the petition of two congregation members.³²

On September 12, 2024, the Synod Council notified the church Councilmembers and Perkins of its decisions. The Synod Council determined that the officers of the church were the people elected at the March 7, 2024 Church Council Meeting (Brendle as President, Dolores Graver as Vice President, Cadigan-McAdoo as Treasure, Koelsch as Secretary). It determined that the June 9, 2024 Congregation Meeting was “legally called and conducted and that the decisions made at that meeting [were] valid.” Finally, it determined that Perkins’ “call to serve Resurrection Lutheran Church ended on June 30, 2024.” The Synod Council called on Perkins and all members of the church to abide by these decisions.³³

²⁵ Lawfer at ¶¶ 1.c., 7. The prior council minutes do not accompany the defendants’ motion or Lawfer’s affidavit.

²⁶ Exhibit 3.

²⁷ *Id.* at ¶¶ 31, 33.

²⁸ *Id.* at ¶¶ 34-38.

²⁹ *Id.* at ¶¶ 39-41. *See also* Exhibit 1, C10.04.

³⁰ *Id.* at ¶¶ 42-45.

³¹ Koelsch, Attachment 6.

³² *Id.* *See also* Lawfer at ¶ 8.

³³ Koelsch, ¶ 70 and Attachment 6. *See also*, generally, Oslovich.

On September 21, 2024, Bishop Tim Oslovich, Bishop of the Alaska Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Alaska, confirmed the Synod Council's decisions in his own letter to the church community.³⁴

3. LAW

3.1. Motion to Dismiss

Lack of jurisdiction, unless the court orders otherwise, must be determined before trial.³⁵ “Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter the court shall dismiss the action.”³⁶

Motions to dismiss are viewed with disfavor and should rarely be granted.³⁷

3.2. Motions for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper if the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.³⁸ All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.³⁹ The non-moving party must “demonstrate that a genuine issue of fact exists to be litigated by showing that it can produce admissible evidence reasonably tending to dispute the movant’s evidence.”⁴⁰ Unsupported assumptions and speculations are not sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.⁴¹

³⁴ Koelsch, ¶ 71 and Attachment 7. *See also* Oslovich at ¶ 17a-f, which provides a detailed account of the efforts to resolve the dispute, including the adjudication process, from the request for consultation, to the referral to the Alaska Synod Consultation Committee, to arbitration before the Alaska Synod Council. *See also* Oslovich, generally, for the interplay between the church Constitution and the Alaska Synod Constitution.

³⁵ Ak. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction

³⁶ Ak. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

³⁷ *Kollodge v. State*, 757 P.2d 1024 (Alaska 1988). *Neese v. Lithia Chrysler Jeep of Anchorage, Inc.*, 210 P.3d 1213 (Alaska 2009).

³⁸ *Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc.*, 335 P.3d 514, 517 (Alaska 2014).

³⁹ *Greywolf v. Carroll*, 151 P.3d 1234, 1240 (Alaska 2007).

⁴⁰ *French v. Jadon, Inc.*, 911 P.2d 20, 23 (Alaska 1996).

⁴¹ *Id.* at 26 (stating that once an employer has provided admissible evidence that an employee was terminated for legitimate reasons, the employee must offer more than inadmissible personal guesses, assumptions, opinions, and speculations in order to raise a genuine issue of material fact); *Christensen*, 335 P.3d at 520 (citing *Peterson v. State, Dep't of Natural Res.*, 236 P.3d 355, 367 (Alaska 2010) and *Mahan v. Arctic Catering, Inc.*, 133 P.3d 655, 661 (Alaska 2006)).

3.3. Ecclesiastical Abstention and the Ministerial Exception

3.3.1 *The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine*

More than one hundred fifty years ago, the Supreme Court “began to place matters of church government and administration beyond the purview of civil authorities.”⁴² Under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, civil courts cannot delve into matters that focus on “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of a church to the standard of morals required of them....”⁴³

In *Watson v. Jones*, one of two factions struggling for control of church property had been recognized by the highest ecclesiastical body of the Presbyterian Church as the “regular and lawful” governing body of the church.⁴⁴ The dissident faction appealed a state court’s decision that it was bound by the ecclesiastical ruling.⁴⁵ The Supreme Court affirmed:

. . . whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.⁴⁶

Nearly a century ago, in *Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop*, the petitioner challenged a decision by the Archbishop of Manila, who had refused to appoint him to chaplaincy on the ground that, according to Canon Law then in force, he did not possess the required qualifications.⁴⁷ The Supreme Court upheld the Archbishop’s determination:

In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise.⁴⁸

⁴² *McClure v. Salvation Army*, 460 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 1972).

⁴³ *Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich*, 426 U.S. 696, 714 (1976) (quoting *Watson v. Jones*, 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1871)).

⁴⁴ 80 U.S. 679 (1871).

⁴⁵ *Id.* at 687.

⁴⁶ *Id.* at 727.

⁴⁷ 280 U.S. 1 (1929).

⁴⁸ *Id.* at 16.

In *Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral*, the principle announced by *Watson* and *Gonzales* became a constitutional prohibition: “Legislation that regulates church administration, the operation of the churches [or] the appointment of clergy ... prohibits the free exercise of religion.”⁴⁹ In *Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral*,⁵⁰ the prohibition was further refined: constitutional principles prevent the judiciary, as well as the legislature, from interfering with the free exercise of religion.

These opinions radiate “a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”⁵¹

Alaska has embraced the general tenor of this line of cases. “[N]o value has a higher place in our constitutional system of government than that of religious freedom.”⁵²

3.3.2 *The ministerial exception*

From this general principle stems the “ministerial exception,” which precludes the application of “laws governing the employment relationship between a religious institution and certain key employees.”⁵³ “[It] is impermissible for the government to contradict a church’s determination of who can act” in these critical roles.⁵⁴ “The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.”⁵⁵

“By its terms, the rule permits no exceptions. It is categorical.”⁵⁶

“Delineating a religious organization’s decisions between religious and secular would create excessive entanglement between the church and state, given the coercive

⁴⁹ 344 U.S. 94, 107 (1952).

⁵⁰ 363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960).

⁵¹ *Kedroff*, 344 U.S. at 116.

⁵² *Frank v. State*, 604 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Alaska 1979)

⁵³ *Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. V. Morrissey-Berru*, 591 U.S. 732, 737, 140 S.Ct. 2049, 207 L.Ed.2d 870 (2020).

⁵⁴ *Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. V. EEOC*, 565 U.S. 171, 185, 132 S.Ct. 694, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012).

⁵⁵ *McClure*, 460 F.2d at 558-59.

⁵⁶ *Markel v. Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America*, 124 F.4th 796, 803 (9th Circuit 2024), cert. denied, 145 S.Ct. 2822 (2025).

nature of the discovery process.”⁵⁷ “A religious institution’s decisions, even if facially secular, are often intertwined with religious doctrine.”⁵⁸

4. ANALYSIS

4.1. The Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss

4.1.1 *The church is hierarchical, not congregational. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and the ministerial exception apply.*

Defendants asserts that the church Constitution vests authority in the congregation and its elected council, not in any higher ecclesiastical body.⁵⁹ Defendants attach and refer to that Constitution but ignore its plain language.⁶⁰

The church is “interdependent” with ELCA and the Alaska Synod.⁶¹ It is subject to ELCA discipline.⁶² Its pastor must be a member of the roster of Ministers of Word and Sacrament of ELCA.⁶³ If the church ceases to exist, its undisposed property passes to the Alaska Synod.⁶⁴

And, most telling, and essentially dispositive, it accepts the final authority of the Alaska Synod with respect to the adjudication of congregational disagreements.⁶⁵

Perkins argues that she simply challenges the legal authority of one congregational faction to terminate her employment, “not the church’s religious reasons for doing so.”⁶⁶ She argues that the court can resolve this matter by applying neutral principles of law: “the [court] only needs to interpret the church’s bylaws and state statutes.”⁶⁷

In *St. Paul Church, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Alaska Missionary Conference of the United Methodist Church*, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted the “neutral principles”

⁵⁷ *Markel*, 124 F.4th at 808.

⁵⁸ *Id.*

⁵⁹ *Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment*, 7.

⁶⁰ “[T]o attempt to so interfere through a *C15.11/S17.11 adjudication, would be a constitutional travesty. Lawfer at ¶ 2.d. The defendants cannot choose which portions of their Constitution to follow and which to decry as a travesty. The document must be read as a whole.

⁶¹ Exhibit 1, *C6.01.

⁶² *Id.*

⁶³ *Id.* at *C9.02.

⁶⁴ *Id.* at *C7.01.

⁶⁵ *Id.* at *C15.11.

⁶⁶ *Opposition to Motion to Dismiss*, p. 8.

⁶⁷ *Opposition to Motion to Dismiss*, 7.

approach “when resolving property disputes between religious organizations.”⁶⁸ The principle requires courts to examine the deeds to the property, the charter of the church, the “book of order or discipline” of the general church, and the “applicable state statutes.”⁶⁹

While the governance issues in this dispute incidentally involve property, the court has already reviewed the “charter of the church.” The defendants vaguely reference a single state statute,⁷⁰ requiring corporate directors to act in accordance with governing documents, to argue that Brendle’s *ultra vires* actions were void.

As noted above, the court has interpreted the church’s bylaws, which mandate precisely the actions that the Alaska Synod has taken, consistent with the church’s Constitution. The respective powers of the feuding factions, including their power to terminate Perkins’ call, have been determined by ecclesiastical authority

In *Herning v. Eason*, the Supreme Court rejected a “free exercise” claim and held that a church’s bylaws did not prohibit proxy voting.⁷¹ This limited holding does not control here, where the aggrieved defendants seek to overturn a church election and install a substitute slate of officers. The court will not declare Brendle ineligible to serve after the Alaska Synod has determined that she is.

Any purportedly “neutral principle” in this context could only inappropriately entangle the court in the church’s mission.

There is clearly a substantive disagreement between congregational factions, “an unfortunate schism ... about the mission and policies of the church and the ministry of ... Perkins,” in the words of Bishop Oslovich.⁷² The Synod Council has adjudicated the dispute.

The defendants effectively seek to appeal the decision of an ecclesiastical adjudicative body to this secular court. The court will not accept that call. No neutral principle permits the court to ignore the procedure set out in the church’s own governing documents, and no conceivable conception of this court’s power allows it to regulate the mission and policies of this church in crisis.

Because it lacks jurisdiction over Perkins’ claims regarding employment, the court will grant the plaintiffs’ *Motion to Dismiss*.

⁶⁸ 145 P.3d 541, 553 (Alaska 2006).

⁶⁹ *Id.*

⁷⁰ AS 10.06.483. *Opposition to Motion to Dismiss*, 9.

⁷¹ 739 P.2d 167, 168 (Alaska 1987).

⁷² Oslovich at ¶ 16.

4.2. The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

The court cannot grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

All, or nearly all, of the facts in their Statement of Facts⁷³ are either explicitly contested, or unsupported speculation.⁷⁴

The defendants assert that Brendle's tenure on the council and her actions as council president are void because she exceeded a six-year limitation for service in the church Constitution. The only source for this allegation is Lawfer's self-serving affidavit, and it is directly disputed by the Synod Council's determination that the March 7, 2024 election was properly conducted and that the officers elected thereby were properly elected. On that basis, alone, summary judgment is inappropriate.

The defendants assert that a Meeting Code of Conduct prohibiting, among other behavior, "yelling, screaming, bullying, harassing or swarming" was adopted and enforceable.⁷⁵ The plaintiffs directly dispute this contention.⁷⁶ The only details of the alleged bullying, and of other outrageous and shocking behavior, are buried in an unsupported footnote.⁷⁷ The court can no more enforce a disputed vaguely worded anti-bullying provision than it can require the parties to follow the golden rule.⁷⁸

Similarly, the defendants' briefing refers in a footnote to Brendle's resignation and a letter explaining it, and speculates about her inner thoughts, while conceding that they "cannot vouch for the validity of the letter."⁷⁹ The passionate arguments of counsel will not support summary judgment.

Because there are multiple genuine issues of material fact, the court cannot grant the defendants' *Motion for Summary Judgment*.

4.3. The Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

The court has already determined that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars Perkins' employment claims, but the same analysis applies to all remaining claims.

⁷³ *Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment*, 3-6.

⁷⁴ Compare Koelsch at ¶¶ 12-15, 17-32 with Lawfer and Exhibit 3. *See also* Affidavit of Kristin Cadigan-McAdoo, ¶ 5; *see also* Oslovich at ¶ 17.

⁷⁵ Lawfer, Exhibit 2.

⁷⁶ Koelsch at ¶¶ 22-23 and Attachment 4.

⁷⁷ *Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment*, p. 9, fn. 7.

⁷⁸ "Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets." Matthew 7:12 (King James Version).

⁷⁹ *Id.* at 6, fn. 5. *See also* Lawfer, ¶ 1.d. & Ex. 1.

Because the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies, and because there are no neutral principles that would allow the court to decide this dispute without impermissibly intruding into the church's mission and policies, the court lacks jurisdiction over the defendants' remaining claims. No disputed material facts can overcome this legal determination, and the court will grant the plaintiffs' *Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment*.

4.4. Defendants' Motion to Compel Discovery

Because the court has granted the motion to dismiss Perkins' employment claims, and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on all remaining claims, the defendants' motion to compel discovery is DENIED AS MOOT.

5. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the plaintiffs' *Motion to Dismiss* is GRANTED.


The defendants' *Motion for Summary Judgment* is DENIED.

The plaintiffs' *Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment* is GRANTED.

The defendants' *Motion to Compel Discovery* is DENIED AS MOOT.

The parties must now follow the abiding and eternal commands of their shared faith, not the fleeting, worldly demands of this secular court.

SO ORDERED at Juneau, Alaska, on November 24, 2025.



Larry R. Woolford
Superior Court Judge

Alaska Trial Courts

Certificate of Distribution

Case Number: 1JU-24-00681CI

Case Title: RESURRECTION LUTHERAN CHURCH ALASKA VS. LAWFER, KAREN

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